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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONNA McBROOM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HOWARD KIRTLEY McBROOM 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9702 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S 
ANSWERING BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With reference to the statement of facts as 
given by the defendant and appellant, the defendant 
has not attempted to set forth facts, but rather to 
malign the plaintiff with generalities which are not 
supported by the record and certainly in no sense 
supported by the findings of fact which were entered 
and signed by the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson. 
In this regard the plaintiff feels it necessary to 
answer the defendant's statements in order that the 
court will not be mislead into believing the general-
ities which defendant has set forth. 
It is true the court found for the defendant with 
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respect to the divorce itself. However, the plaintiff 
calls the court's attention to paragraph 7 of the 
findings of Fact (R. 39) which specifically sets forth 
the grounds upon which the decree was granted, 
to-wit: 
"During the marriage of the parties the 
plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly causing 
him great mental distress and suffering, and 
more particularly: Plaintiff has in violation 
of the marriage contract gone out with an-
oth·er man." 
With respect to defendant's statement that 
plaintiff fraudulently commenced this action, this 
sta1tement is not true. See R. 287 of the record, 
wherein plaintiff testified with respect to the original 
complaint: 
"Q. You stated in your affidavit that 
during the marriage of the parties Mr. Me 
Broom had treated you cruelly causing you 
great mental and physical distress and suf-
fering. 
"A. True. 
"Q. More particularly, that the defend-
ant drinks to excess. 
"A. True. 
"Q. He has a violent, ungovernable tem-
per and on many occasions has physically beat 
and abused you. 
"A. True. 
"Q. All this true? 
"A. I don't know about "beating'' but he 
has physically abused me. 
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"Q. You are afraid he will do you bodily 
harm? 
"A. True. 
"Q. Unless restrained and enjoined? 
"A. T ru·e. 
See also R. 360 and R. 395, R. 464, R. 565 
of the record. 
With respect to defendant's statement in his 
brief that the plaintiff had persistently disappeared 
from the home of the parties and stayed out all 
night, the defendant is again quoting solely from 
the testimony of Mr. McBroom without any cor-
roboration whatsoever, and totally disregarding the 
testimony of Mrs. McBroom. See R. 546, R. 533, R. 
534. 
With respect to the reconciliation of the parties 
vvhich took place in September, 1962, plaintiff testi-
fied that she and the defendant (R. 211), after the 
defendant had been away from home for approx-
imately two weeks, discussed a lot of things between 
them, including her going out with a Bertram Jarvis 
and that they had both decided they had done things 
in their marriage that were wrong and that were 
not good for their marriage; and that they had 
decided to let bygones be bygones and go from there. 
The state1nents of defendant that plaintiff had been 
carrying on an immoral and adulterous relation-
ship with a married man are without basis in the 
record; there is no testimony or evidence to support 
said statements. See R. 201, 207, 209, 251, 298, 309, 
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353. More significant than the testimony of either 
one of these parties is the fact that the court did 
not make a finding that there was any immoral or 
adulterous relationship being carried on between 
the plaintiff and any man. 
With respect to the defendant's statement that 
the plaintiff deliberately set out in her own hand-
writing a design, scheme and plan to commence 
di·vorce and take from defendant his home, children 
and livelihood, this is purely imagination on the 
part of defendant. See Exhi'bit 6, also R. 214, 219 
of the record wherein it states: 
"July 22, 1961, be nice, but cold and def-
initely independent; be calm, quiet and con-
siderate of the kids; do things with them; 
remember he is no longer your husband you 
are no longer his wife; you don't need him; 
make your own decisions; move out of the 
bedroom. If he insists on being a pig, do some-
thing, go to an attorney. Try it for one week; 
make a list of the good and bad, then tell 
him. The way you feel you couldn't be more 
divorced legally than you are in your own 
heart. From now on I will consider myself 
divorced, I will not live with him as a wife. 
If he cares to live here, he will be neat and 
clean and keep the house in the same order 
in which he finds it; otherwise I will be 
forced to make it legal." 
Certainly this testi1nony as introduced by the 
defendant himself does not indicate in anyway an 
intent on the part of the plaintiff to scheme and take 
away the defendant's children, home and property; 
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but rather a sincere effort on plaintiff's part to 
determine what was wron·g with their marriag·e and 
attempt to correct the difficultes. Furthermore, the 
statement of the defendant that 'the plaintiff had ad-
mitted in her own handwriting that her motive in at-
tempting to terminate their marriage was not be-
cause of misconduct on the p·art of defendant but be-
cause of her reDa.tionship with Jarvis, is entirely un-
true. See R. 191, 1'90, 19'3, 194, 195, 426, 19'7, 200, 
214, '224, 245, 246, 218, 386, 388, 2'31, 256, 29'5, 296, 
302, 306, 308, 316, 429, 551, 37 4, 455 an'd 402 where-
in the plaintiff testified with respect to the defend-
ant's drinking, the physical abuse, the defendant's re-
lation with the other woman, Karen, his failure to as-
sume any responsibility around the home with respect 
to yard work or cleaning up and keeping the home in 
proper order, or performing little tasks aroun1d the 
home which any ordinary husband should perform 
such as installing a front porch light, which the de-
fendan't would not do, and it was necessary for plain-
tiff to call in \a neighbor to help her install it, or water-
ing the lawn or painting. S·ee further R. 545, 361, 
368, 377, 379, 380, wherein the plaintiff testified that 
defendant had not allowed her to sleep for three 
nig;hts in a row; and wherein she pled with defend-
ant to allow her to talk to Mr. Ralph McBroom, 
the defendant's brother, and wherein the plaintiff 
asked Mr. Ralph McBroom to please tell Howard 
to let her get some sleep, that she was exhausted. 
See R. 384 where the plaintiff testified that she 
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requested the defendant to seek marriage couns·el-
ing with her. Also R. 394, 397, 214, 404, 424, 426, 
192,441,470,471,534,547,559,439,438,402. Aread-
ing of the record certainly indicates a stormy mar-
riage for these people, and if fault there be, it lies 
on the shoulders of both parties and not just one 
of these parties. See R. 404 where the plaintiff 
testified that defendant admitted to her he had 
been going out with women from the time Kirt was 
one year old. 
Defendant's statem·ent in his brief wherein de-
fendant testified that commencing in 1956 the plain-
tiff began disappearing from the home of the parties 
and returning late at night under the influence of 
alcohol, and the refusal of plaintiff to participate 
in the activities of the family with the minor chil-
dren. All of these statements were denied by the 
plaintiff. See R. 546, 534, 573, 548, 245, 282, with 
respect to the Lagoon outing, concerning which the 
defendant makes such contention that the plaintiff 
refused to go with him, when in truth and fact, 
according to the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant 
did not e·ven invite her. And on another occasion 
when sh·e had stayed home to clean the house in 
order that the defendant's brother and wife could 
co1ne and visit then1 that evening for a birthday 
celebration. R. 546, 571. 
With respect to the statement of defendant that 
plaintiff stayed with Jarvis in his home in Kearns, 
the truth of the matter is that she 'Yas there in 
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his home approximately 45 minutes. R. 284. Or, 
that she had stayed in his apartment. She had been 
at his apart1nent only long enough to help him put 
some work pants on a stretcher, and then left. R. 
301. And defendant's statement that she had b·een 
a\vay in the canyons with him. This occurred on 
one occasion, and she returned home before eight 
o'clock in the evening. 
It would seem strange that if the contentions 
of the defendant are true, as he has set forth in 
his brief, that the trial judge would not have made 
findings of fact which were more consistent with 
contentions of the defendant. 
The defendant comments in his brief that the 
plaintiff commenced using contraceptives in August 
of 1961, when actually the contraceptives they speak 
of were purchased back in 1955. See R. 453, also 
R. 550, 551, wherein the plaintiff definitely testi-
fied that these contraceptives were never used for 
intercourse with anybody other than her husband. 
R. 550. The obvious conclusion is that they had 
been used by plaintiff and defendant since they were 
purchased in 1955. 
At page 10 of the defendant's brief, defendant 
seems to make light of the fact that plaintiff kept 
a menstrual chart, Exhibit 21, which was a 1961 
calendar. It is curious to note the notations which 
were placed on said calendar. "Monthly Record." 
"New toothbrushes." "Started 5-19-61 ended 9-10." 
"H. drank and brought up the paper." "How long 
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can I take it." Seven x's on December 19, 21, 22, 27, 
29, 30 ,anid 31. Said "x'1s" indicating the days that 
defendant was drinking. R. 360. "Saw him in front 
of the Pecan 12-2." "What a year, I hope I never have 
another one like that." Notations on the reverse side 
of the 19'60 calendar are laS follows: "Monthly Re-
cord." "'He did it again." "Physical cruelty by How-
ard :before kids." "Mrs. Hall did not work." "Mrs. 
Hall one half a day." '''Tendency to have headache." 
With respect to the defendant's contention that 
the plaintiff did not provide proper care for her 
children, Mrs. McDonald, the children's school 
teacher testified as follows R. 345: 
"Q. You are familiar with Mrs. Me 
Broom, are you not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is she active in any school organiza-
tions? 
"A. Yes, she has been in PTA and always 
showed deep concern for the welfare of the 
children. I noticed it then and I notice it 
now." 
Further, at R. 513, the testimony of Mrs. Me 
Donald: 
"A. Yes she has. Just today the nominat-
ing committee asked her to serve as presi-
dent of the PTA for the year 1962-63." (refer-
ring to Mrs. McBroom) 
Further, on cross-exrunination of Mrs. McDon-
ald by defendant's counsel: (R. 513) 
"Q. Mrs. McDonald are you aware of the 
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·evidence that has been presented at this pro-
ceeding? 
"A. Part of it. 
"Q. The nature of it? 
"A. Part of it from what you read the 
other day. 
"Q. Did you advise the committee of 
this? 
"A. I had nothing to do with the com-
mittee. 
"Q. I see, as far as you know the com-
mittee is not aware of any of this evidence? 
"A. I think they are because the pres-
ident of the PTA has called in to get quite a 
lot of information. 
"Q. Do you think they know quite a lot 
about this? 
"A. Didn't you call Mrs. Huffner? 
"Q. I don't know. 
"A. I think you did. 
"Q. I interviewed quite a good many 
witnesses. 
"A. I think you did a pretty thorough 
job. 
"Q. In spite of the evidence the commit-
tee apparently still wants her to govern our 
children in that area of the city? 
"A. They may not accept your ·evidence." 
With respect to the defendant's assertion that 
he \vas a good father and that plaintiff had no con-
cern when the children were with him, it is inter-
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esting to note the plaintiff's testimony R. 205: 
"Q. When he has those children you 
don't have to worry for one minute about 
their welfare, do you? 
"A. Not unless he is drinking." 
To the defendant's contention on page 12 of 
his brief that plaintiff arrived home in the early 
morning hours under the influence of alcohol and 
neglected her children; that she was physically un-
able to care for her children-such was denied by 
the plaintiff. Certainly such testimony on the part 
of the defendant was not believed by the trial judge, 
otherwise he would not have found that plaintiff 
was a fit and proper person to have custody of the 
children. R. 38, 39. 
With reference to the plaintiff attending church 
at the Presbyterian Church, the plaintiff testified, 
"I hav·e frequently attended the Presbyterian 
Church, except when I was obviously not invited." 
R. 56, 574. 
Further, with respect to the plaintiff's caring 
for the children properly, see the testimony of un-
biased and unprejudiced neighbors of plaintiff and 
defendant. The testimony of Mrs. Glade K. Jenson, 
R. 514 to 517. The testimony of Mrs. Beverly Chase, 
R. 355, 518, 519, 180. Mrs. Clarence R. Hall, in this 
respect also, R. 506- 511. Laurence McCormick, R. 
384 to 389. 
With respect to defendant's inco1ne, th·e defend-
ant's gross income was $8,200.00 for the year 1961, 
10 
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with a net after deducting "automobile depreciation, 
mileage and other expenses," of $547.00 per month. 
R. 181. And \vhile at page 21 of defendant's brief, 
the defendant is extolling his virtues as to being 
a provider in the home, the plaintiff was also work-
ing and earning a monthly income of som·e $370.00 
per month gross income, which the plaintiff was 
contributing to the family expenses without the 
benefit of "deductible expenses." Plaintiff's monthly 
gross earnings at Kennecott were $370.00 per month 
R. 185, from which plaintiff made her own monthly 
payment on her automobile, R. 185. With reference 
to plaintiff's earnings, see Exhibit 1 and particu-
larly attached thereto the employee pay statem·ents 
showing net earnings of $114.19 for one pay period 
and $100.37 for the next pay period, showing a net 
income of $214.56 per month. See also Exhibit 46. 
It should be noted at this point that said pay-
check stubs show a Credit Union deduction of $45.00 
per pay period. Said Credit deductions are applied 
as follows: $74.00 payment on plaintiff's automobile 
and the balance used for taxes and insurance on 
said automobile of plaintiff. R. 69, 66. 
With respect to the defendant's statement on 
page 32 of his brief, that the plaintiff offered no 
evidence of a constructive progam for the care and 
protection of the children. Reference should be made 
to the testimony of the neighbors and school teacher, 
whose testimony the plaintiff offered, and compare 
the same with the naturally biased testimony which 
11 
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the defendant offered through his 77 year old 
mother, anld :Mrs. R. A. McBroom, who h.as five chil-
dren of her own to care for, and is th·e wife of the 
defendant's brother, Mr. Ralph McBroom. 
Admittedly the plaintiff must leave the children 
\Vith baby tend·ers while she is at work. However, 
the defendant could offer no other alternative. Sure-
ly if the defendant wants to pay sufficient to ·enable 
the plaintiff to stay home and care for the children 
on a full-time basis, she would be perfectly willing 
-: to do so. However, apparently he was not concerned 
about this during the four-year period during th·eir 
marriage that the plaintiff was working. See de-
fendant's brief page 53. 
With reference to the Exhibits 28 through 37, 
pictures and other written documents, certainly 
the defendant was aware of these items being in 
the home. By the plaintiff's own testimony she did 
not e·ven recall these items. R. 334, 335, 336. If the 
defendant had been so shocked and disgusted at 
these exhibits, certainly he would hav·e destroyed 
them on his own in May of 1961 when he claims to 
have discovered them and would not have waited 
until January 15 of 1962 to take them with him when 
he removed his "financial records" from the hom·e. 
12 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING CUSTODY 
OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF. 
Even though defendant was awarded the divorce 
in this matter, the lower court specifically found 
plaintiff a fit and proper person to be awared the 
care, custody and control of the minor children of 
the parties. Defendant's assertions, "that plaintiff 
visited insidious and immoral depravity upon the 
children" is not supported by the record and the 
lower court specifically found to the contrary. 
In the case of SMITH v. SMITH, 1 Utah 2d 75, 
77, 262 P.2d 283, 284, this court stated: 
"The determining issue h·ere is what will 
be for the best interest of the child. This is 
an ultimate question of fact which the trial 
court found in the mother's favor. Child cus-
tody cases are equitable in nature and so we 
must review both the law and the facts. Here 
we have a double problem of determining not 
only the occurrences and ·events here involved 
but the much more uncertain and controvers-
ial problem of trying to look into the future 
and see the effect on the happin·ess and well 
being of the child each course will bring, and 
thus determine which course will be for the 
best interest of the child. In making this 
decision we must keep in mind that the trial 
court saw and heard the witnesses when they 
gave their testimony and is thus in a much 
better position to understand and evaluate 
their testimony than we are from reading 
13 
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the cold record. This is particularly true in 
determining which will best serve the interest 
of the child, for the trial court has seen the 
contestants in action, has observed their per-
sonalities, manners and attitudes, and has had 
the opportunity to evaluate the ability of each 
of the parties concerned to win the friend-
ship, confidence, love and control of the child 
and the affect on its life that association with 
each of such parties may have. In view of 
these facts we hesitate to over turn the find-
ings of the trial court unless we find them 
·evidently erroneous." 
See also WALTON v. KAUFMAN, 110 Utah 1, 
169 P.2d 97; BRIGGS v. BRIGGS, 111 Utah 418, 
181 P.2d 223; SAMPSELL v. HOLT, 115 Utah 73, 
202 P.2d 550; STUBER v. STUBER, 121 Utah 632, 
.244 P.2d 650. 
The obvious conclusion from the evidence is that 
the trial court concluded that plaintiff was better 
suited to have the custody of the children awarded 
to her, and to this effect the court so found and 
so stated in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFF $200.00 PER MONTH FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE TWO 
MINOR CHILDREN, THE HOME OF THE PARTIES, THE FURN-
ITURE AND FIXTURES IN THE HOME EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN 
ITEMS AWARDED TO DEFENDANT, AND THE PLAINTIFF'S 
OWN AU'TOMOBILE. 
Defendant's gross income for th·e year 1961 
was $8200.00 with a net after deducting "automobile 
depreciation, mileage and other expenses," of some 
$547.00 per month R. 181. In addition to the $200.00 
14 
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per month stlpport money for the two minor chil-
dren, defendant was ordered to assume the obliga-
tion to the Seaboard Finance Co. payable at the 
rate of $31.00 per month, and to pay the loan on the 
stereo to Walker Bank, which loan amounted to 
$114.00 at the rate of $19.00 per month, and which 
should ha:ve been paid off by the 1st day of January, 
1963. R. 68, 69. Said stereo was awarded to the 
defendant as his sole and separate property. The 
plaintiff on the other hand was ordered to assume 
and pay the obligation on her own automobile 
amounting to $74.00 per .month, which obligation 
the plaintiff is still paying. Defendant's statement 
in his brief at page 48 to the effect that plaintiff 
has a net income of $370.00 per month from her 
employment is entirely erron.eous, as the defendant 
vvell knows th·e plaintiff's gross monthly earnings 
were $370.00 with net nearings of $214.56 per month 
ater the credit union deduction. See exhibit 46. The 
defendant in his affidavit in support of his motion 
to amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree specifically stated that the total amount 
of his monthly obligations, in addition to the $200.00 
per month support money, amounted to the sum 
of $146.00 per month. R. 68, 69. The plaintiff, in 
addition to the foregoing, must make the monthly 
payment on the home of the parties in the sum of 
$82.50 per month. Based upon the foregoing, it is 
obvious that the trial court had sufficient basis 
upon which to make a finding that the defendant 
15 
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should pay the sum of $100.00 per month per child 
and the additional sum of $1.00 per year as alimony. 
The plaintiff's as well as the d·efendant's accumu-
lated earnings enabled the parties to acquire the 
home and furnishings of the parties. The fact that 
the court awarded the home and furnishings to the 
plaintiff is further evidence that the court considered 
the plaintiff to be a fit and proper person to have 
custody of the children, and that the hom·e and 
furnishings were necessary to enable her to properly 
care for said children. Here again the recent deci-
sions of this court have afiirmed the position that 
the distribution of property by the trial court should 
not be interfered with unless th·ere is indicated a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
In the case of WILSON v. WILSON, 5 Utah 
2d 79 page 84, 296 P.2d 977, the court stated: 
"It is true, as defendant contends, that 
a divorce proceeding is equitable and that it 
is within the prerogative of this court to re-
view the evidenee and to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the trial court under proper 
circumstances. The more recent pronounce-
ments of this court, and the policy to which 
w·e adhere, are to the effect that the trial 
judge has considerable latitude and discrim-
ination in such matters, and that his judg-
ment should not be changed lightly, and in 
fact, not at all, unless it were such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear 
abus·e of discretion." 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See also McDONALD v. McDONALD, 120 Utah 
573, 236 P.2d 1066; LAWLOR v. LAWLOR, 240 P.2d 
271; 121 Utah 201. 
The property of the parties although meager 
in nature was accumulated by the joint efforts and 
earnings of both parties and the fact that the trial 
court awarded the home and furnishings to the 
plaintiff does not represent an abuse of discretion. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFF $1.00 PER YEAR ALIMONY AND $750.00 ATTORNEYS 
FEES. 
Defendant's statement to the effect that the 
plaintiff's suit was commenced fraudulently is entire-
ly groundless as shown by plaintiff's statement of 
facts. With respect to the question of attorneys 
fees being awarded to the plaintiff, the defendant 
cites the case of Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah 242, 139 P. 
937, and Graziano v. Gr1aziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 
P.2d 931. Certainly the Graziano case is in no way 
comparable to the situation in the case at bar. In 
the Graziano case the defendant husband had no 
income except as an inducted G.I. soldier. And in 
that instance the plaintiff wife declared her ability 
to take care of her own needs. Th·e case of Holm v. 
Holm is similar to that of the Graziano case, and 
is not comparable to the case at bar. 
As the court can readily determine from the 
voluminous record in this case, considerable time 
was spent in the preparation and trial of this action, 
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the actual trial lasting four days. The lower court 
in making an award of counsel fees to the plaintiff 
specifically stated R. 43: 
"Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to 
plaintiff to assist her in paying her attorneys 
fees the sum of $750.00 and plaintiff is hereby 
awarded judgment against defendant for said 
amount." 
It was specifically agreed between plaintiff and de-
fendant that the question of attorneys fees and the 
amount thereof would be left to the discretion of 
the trial judge. R. 410. 
This court has said on many occasions that it 
will not substitute its judgment in a divorce pro-
ceeding relative to alimony and division of property 
for that of the trial court unless the record clearly 
discloses that the trial court's decree in such matter 
is plainly arbitrary. See ALLEN v. ALLEN, 109 
Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872. Certainly there is no showing 
that the trial court abused its discretion or was 
arbitrary in this matter. The court felt that in 
view of the necessity for the plaintiff to work to 
assist in the support and maintenance of herself and 
the minor children, and th·e income of defendant, 
that the retention of $1.00 per year as alimony 
was necessary and proper. The necessity of plaintiff 
making application for alimony in the event of illn·ess 
or other matters rendering her destitute would re-
quire such protection. 
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Furthermore, the awarding of $750.00 attorneys 
fees to the plaintiff to assist her in pay.ment of her 
counsel fees is not unreasonable and does not show 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELA,ND S. McCULLOUGH 
304 East First South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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